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Abstract: Volumetric pricing as envisaged within the Water Framework Directive (60/2000) is a
considerable challenge in terms of irrigation in Mediterranean regions, since a large share of the
water source is groundwater. Enforcing this pricing scheme involves systematic metering and control
(M&C) systems with subsequent high costs. This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature related to
the assessment of costs for the metering and control of irrigation groundwater. The full operational
cost of all activities related to the hypothetical services provided by a public agency is assessed for
Apulia (a region in southern Italy). The results show that point-to-point metering services are quite
costly, ranging from 38.5 to 59 euros per delivery point. New questions arise regarding whether the
M&C of groundwater abstraction should be fully charged to end users (i.e., farmers), or also shared
with the whole society as a public service aimed at environmental enhancement.
Keywords: groundwater; volumetric pricing; metering; irrigation; Apulia
1. Introduction
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) issued by the European Union (EU) in 2000, recommends
full cost recovery and suggests direct water pricing as the most effective approach to managing
irrigation water. In order to implement this directive, EU member countries need to extend
water-pricing policies, traditionally applied to on-demand pressured water services (e.g., drinking
water) to other types of water services. In this regard, a recent decree of the Italian Agriculture
Ministry [1] paved the way towards the accounting in irrigation-water uses, which in turn allows for
fully recovering of associated costs (i.e., financial, resource, and environmental costs).
Field and Field [2] noted that there is a natural tendency to think that the enactment of a law
automatically leads to the rectification of the problem to which it is addressed. This tendency is
obviously too simplistic, since the enactment of a policy is only one aspect of the regulatory process.
At present, the literature [3] considers five stages in the lifecycle of a policy: agenda-setting, formulation
(or enactment), public decision-making, implementation and evaluation. In order to implement a
policy effectively, many resources are needed throughout the different stages of its cycle.
Enforcing water-pricing policy entails the metering and control (M&C) of water uses. Viaggi et al. [4]
discussed water pricing under asymmetric information in the context of the directive 60/2000, arguing
that the economic feasibility of volumetric pricing in agriculture is hindered by the excessive transaction
cost incurred for irrigation water metering.
With reference to groundwater, it is worth mentioning that this resource exhibits the common
pool features (i.e., non-excludable and rival), which in turn makes the problem quite difficult to be
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solved [5]. The economic theory defines a common good as an economic good with high rate of
rivalry and a low rate of excludability. When the rate of excludability is low, there are problems in
excluding someone from the use of the good (i.e., high cost of excludability, practical or legal obstacles
in implementing excludability). Indeed, it is generally difficult and costly to implement and enforce
any policy management of groundwater use. While paradigms for management of common pool
resources (e.g., groundwater) have been theorized [6], and various solutions have been investigated and
tested [7], with a few exceptions worldwide, little has been done to regulate groundwater extraction [8].
Undoubtedly, the adoption of volumetric pricing to groundwater resources is the greatest challenge
for agriculture.
In the case of groundwater sources, which are distributed and often managed directly by farmers,
the metering as well as recording can be costly. As the water is self-supplied, this sector generally
falls outside the scope of pricing charges. In the case of groundwater, the farmers have typically only
paid the private costs of directly accessing the aquifer; such as drilling the well or installing the pump,
but the other costs associated with groundwater use have traditionally been offloaded on the general
public. Although the ability to charge users according to actual use is beneficial, it is questionable
whether that benefit is worth the increased expense of metering.
A key issue in groundwater management is the size of the groundwater user community. In general,
farmers operate in rural areas, therefore the costs for an individual point control on groundwater
withdrawal are expected to be highly relevant [9]. In principle, it is difficult for government authorities
to measure and register all water flows to many smallholders, who may extract the water in relatively
small quantities, or to prevent cheating [10,11]. As argued in [12], water administrations are often not
able to enforce volumetric pricing, due to the large social costs involved in metering and controlling the
actual water volumes extracted by farmers.
A number of studies have investigated the feasibility of irrigation groundwater monitoring.
The proposals for water meters in aquifer management have ranged from centralized online
information-management systems to measuring collective aquifer water extraction [13] based on
controlled electricity usage [14] to prepaid smart meter systems [15].
Despite the fact that the cost of M&C is an important component of all irrigation water services,
to the best of our knowledge there has been little research into the evaluation of such costs related to
the water-pricing policy. Although specific studies on irrigation groundwater are not available, some
studies in the literature deal with “cap and trade” mechanisms for irrigation water, for instance in
Colorado and California [16].
Our aim was to evaluate the metering and control cost of a water-pricing policy applied to
irrigation groundwater. In this paper, we refer to the set of operations needed to verify water users’
compliance with the water-pricing policies, including the application of specific sanctions. We thus
took into account the operations needed to: (i) meter the volume of water withdrawn by the users;
(ii) verify that users are not violating the rules; (iii) record, update and maintain a database of users;
and (iv) implement the sanctioning system.
Considering the fact that metering and control is the key issue in order to enforce volumetric
pricing policies, the aim of this paper was to assess the operational cost incurred for the point-to-point
metering of groundwater resources in agriculture. In doing that, we also attempted to improve the
understanding of cost-effectiveness of M&C operation, specifically for groundwater resources. On the
contrary, we did not attempt to assess the overall transaction cost associated to the implementation of
volumetric pricing in agriculture, of which metering and control are expected to be a large share.
Two study cases were analyzed, which refer to the land-reclamation and irrigation boards (RIBs) of
Capitanata (Consorzio di Bonifica e Irrigazione della Capitanata—CBC) and Ugento Li Foggi (Consorzio
di Bonifica e Irrigazione Ugento Lì Foggi—CBU). Both CBC and CBU are located in Apulia (southern
Italy), a Mediterranean region, which is severely affected by groundwater over-exploitation [17],
water-table depletion and coastal seawater intrusion [18]. Since there are no data with reference to
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the cost of M&C in irrigation water, the study cases were used to carry out the cost assessment of an
at-farm-gate metering and control system on irrigation groundwater.
We assumed that the water organization of the Apulia region had gathered complete information
on the groundwater users and delivering points [19], which were supposed to be already equipped with
metering devices. At the same time, RIBs were considered as fully operative and as taking advantage
of a consolidated routine, with adequate equipment and skilled personnel. Finally, we assumed farmer
transaction costs as negligible.
Section 2 describes Apulia and the methodology applied. Section 3 reports the results, while the
concluding remarks are presented in Section 4.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Apulia
Apulia (southern Italy) (Figure 1) has a Mediterranean climate, characterized by warm-to-hot dry
summers, and mild-to-cool wet winters. Irrigation is important for the overall economy of the region,
especially for agriculture. In 2009/2010, the total irrigated land amounted to 238,546.02 ha with an
estimated volume of 655.29 million m3 [20]. Permanent crops such as olive and grape are widespread,
followed by fresh-cut vegetables (broccoli, carrot, spinach, artichoke, asparagus, etc.) and processing
tomatoes. Overall, these crops account for 80% of the region’s irrigated land.
The average size of the irrigated land is smaller than 5 ha with 63,909 farms using irrigation [6]
(23.5% of total farms). In addition, half of the farms that use irrigation have on-farm wells, while less
than 30% are connected to collective delivery systems. In Apulia there are six reclamation and irrigation
boards (RIB): in Gargano, Capitanata, Arneo, Stornara e Tara, Terre d’Apulia, and Ugento Lì Foggi.
The situation differs across the region. For example, while the Province of Foggia represents the
best example of a collective irrigation delivery system of surface water, within the Province of Lecce,
almost 80% of the irrigation water is derived from direct on-farm access to groundwater resources.
In addition, considering the lack of surface-water bodies, in the Province of Lecce the collective
irrigation delivery systems rely mostly on groundwater sources.
In Apulia, groundwater use is subject to permits issued by the local authorities [21], which are
supposed to monitor the groundwater access (e.g., illegally accessed) and metering of extracted
volumes. The groundwater irrigation rights are issued for five years and are subject to renewal
according to the Water Protection Plan requirements. The license has the allotment limited to 20,000 m3
per year and farmers are required to install on-farm metering devices. In addition, restriction areas
and buffer zones have been established. Groundwater licenses are no longer issued within restriction
areas, and license holders are subject to flow limits. Metering and control (M&C) plays a primary role
for the enhancement of the good ecological status according to the WFD’s goals
Although the drilling of private wells is subject to public authorization or licensing, groundwater
resources have been exploited almost everywhere by a large number of private small users,
thus creating a situation that is difficult to monitor and regulate.
In general, the M&C system is fragmented, and current compliance with the regional law falls far
short of the target [22,23]. In many areas where groundwater is the main freshwater source, pumping
rates exceed the natural recharge rate and cause continuous water-table drawdown, well depletion,
increased pumping costs, and severe seawater intrusion in coastal areas [17,18]. Considering the
current settings of property rights, the legislation, and the nature of the aquifers, the right to use each
well is detained by farmers cultivating the attached farmland. The use right on groundwater cannot be
allocated to neighboring farmers (with some rare exceptions). Therefore, the possibility to regulate the
groundwater by establishing local committees of farmers is not currently feasible.
Our research focused on the Provinces of Foggia and Lecce (Figure 1), as they are representative
of the heterogeneity of the Apulia region with respect to irrigation water. Figure 1 shows how the CBC
regulates most of the Province of Foggia and the CBU stands over most of the Province of Lecce.
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the areas of the CBC, Capitanata, (spots); and CBU, Ugento Li Foggi, 
(stripes), across Apulia. 
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grapevines (26%) and olive trees (14.5%). By contrast, in the Province of Lecce the main irrigated 
crops are olive trees (59.5%), followed by vegetables (17.5%) and grapevines (5.5%). 
Table 1 reports the irrigated crop pattern within the Provinces of Foggia and Lecce. 
Table 1. Irrigated crop pattern (percentage of the total irrigated area). 
Province Grapevines Olive Trees Open Air Vegetables Other Irrigated Crops 
Foggia 26 14.5 37.5 22 
Lecce 5.5 59.5 17.5 17.5 
Source: Our data processing from [6]. 
Table 2 shows the number of licenses issued for groundwater irrigation wells and groundwater 
withdrawal for the Provinces of Foggia and Lecce. 
Table 2. Irrigation groundwater estimates in Apulia Region. 
Province Issued Licenses 1 (Number) Groundwater Withdrawal 2 (m3/Year) 
Foggia 35,888 85,709,211 
Lecce 34,059 44,016,701 
Source: our analysis; 1 regional database [19]; 2 MARSALa project [24]. 
There are two main reasons why the Province of Foggia has greater groundwater withdrawal. 
Firstly, in this area the main irrigated crops are open-air vegetables (very water-demanding crops). 
Secondly, the irrigated area of the Province of Foggia is more than four times that of the Province of 
Lecce. However, regarding the number of issued licenses, there is not such a big difference between 
the two provinces. This because in the Province of Lecce, the groundwater resource is the main 
irrigation water source (about 80% of the total irrigation water source). 
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In the Province of Foggia, the main irrigated crops are vegetables (37.5%), followed by grapevines
(26%) and olive trees (14.5%). By contrast, in the Province of Lecce the main irrigated crops are olive
trees (59.5%), followed by vegetables (17.5%) and grapevines (5.5%).
Table 1 reports the irrigated crop pattern within the Provinces of Foggia and Lecce.
Table 1. Irrigated crop pattern (percentage of the total irrigated area).
Province Grapevines Olive Trees Open Air Vegetables Other Irrigated Crops
Foggia 26 14.5 37.5 22
Lecce 5.5 59.5 17.5 17.5
Source: Our data processing from [6].
Table 2 shows the number of licenses issued for groundwater irrigation wells and groundwater
withdrawal for the Provinces of Foggia and Lecce.
Table 2. Irrigation groundwater estimates in Apulia Region.
Province Issued Licenses 1 (Number) Groundwater Withdrawal 2 (m3/Year)
Foggia 35,888 85,709,211
Lecce 34,059 44,016,701
Source: our analysis; 1 regional database [19]; 2 MARSALa project [24].
There are two main reasons why the Province of Foggia has greater groundwater withdrawal.
Firstly, in this area the main irrigated crops are open-air vegetables (very water-demanding crops).
Secondly, the irrigated area of the Province of Foggia is more than four times that of the Province of
Lecce. However, regarding the number of issued licenses, there is not such a big difference between the
two provinces. This because in the Province of Lecce, the groundwater resource is the main irrigation
water source (about 80% of the total irrigation water source).
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2.2. Methodology to Assess the Cost of Metering and Control (M&C)
At the first, we had to set out the methodology for assessing the cost of M&C. Indeed, as in many
irrigated areas, there are no firms or public organizations which are exclusively devoted to irrigation
groundwater metering. With lack of market prices, we took the RIB as good example of an agency
performing a metering and control services for irrigation water.
Implementing an on-farm M&C system typically involves fixed costs (i.e., installing measuring
devices, setting up the administration and facilities, and variable components that increase with the
water proceeds, i.e., collection activities). The operation may include both measuring the performance
of water users and controlling their compliance with regulations, as well as the development of
monitoring technologies. On the other hand, if there has been lack of compliance, sanctioning includes
the costs of prosecution and conflict resolution.
According to local laws on groundwater use, farmers are required to install on-farm metering
devices, while the local council is responsible for collecting and controlling accessed groundwater
points. As a consequence, we assessed the cost of M&C in cases where on-farm withdraw
points are known [19] and already equipped with metering devices. According to Williamson’s
conceptualization [25], this implies that organizations obtain full information on the location of wells,
the personnel devoted to the activities are loyal to the organizations, farmers are collaborative in
providing the information, while access to all wells is guaranteed.
In order to evaluate such costs, we considered the M&C as a service provided by a public agency.
The provision cost of monitoring and control services was calculated as shown in Equation (1):
K = W + S + Q + T + M + I (1)
where:
K = operational cost of the M&C service;
W = wages of employees involved in the M&C operations, from intellectual labour;
S = salaries of employees involved in the M&C operations, from manual labour;
Q = quota regarding costs for depreciation expenses and insurance policies of the machinery inventory
used in M&C;
T = taxes for M&C operations;
M = miscellaneous expenses for M&C operations;
I = interest on financial capital used for W, Q, T and M.
In terms of M&C operation taxes, we considered only the tax paid by the agency for vehicles,
while in terms of miscellaneous expenses, we considered the costs paid by the agency for consumable
goods and the furniture maintenance of its offices. Note that we considered the annual operational
cost of M&C services.
We then took the reclamation and irrigation boards as a good example of organizations operating
in the sector of water irrigation. While they manage the collective delivery of irrigation systems, the key
points in terms of being a reference agency are: (i) the high number of on-farm water-delivering points
throughout the region’s irrigated areas; (ii) the on-demand irrigation services; (iii) the presence of
metering devices; (iv) at-farm-gate metering and control services; (v) the volumetric charges.
We considered an optimal situation where the RIBs have complete knowledge of the water-
delivering points, already equipped with metering devices. The RIBs were thus considered as fully
operative and as taking advantage of a consolidated routine, with adequate equipment and skilled
personnel. Nonetheless, the RIBs did not report expenditure items with specific reference to the
cost for running on-farm metering and control services. As a consequence, we used the subsequent
methodology to assess the cost of M&C.
In order to estimate the cost of the M&C services for irrigation groundwater, we firstly estimated
the annual provision cost of M&C service (K) made by the selected RIBs. We then related K to the
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number of access points of the RIBs’ irrigation water (i.e., delivery points), obtaining EUR/access point,
and to the RIBs’ cubic meters delivered annually, obtaining EUR/m3. Then we applied the results
obtained for the RIBs (EUR/access point and EUR/m3) to the irrigation groundwater, considering the
access points (the wells) and the annually delivered cubic meters of the provinces where the RIBs that
were used to evaluate the operational cost of the metering and control service were located.
In order to estimate the M&C service cost, data were gathered through: (i) interviews with experts
in resources management; (ii) accounting data of RIBs (2014 and 2015 results); and (iii) in-depth
interviews with the director of each RIB. In this regard, at the beginning of 2015, the two directors were
asked to complete an e-mail questionnaire in order to gather information regarding the formal and
informal routines concerning the M&C services (The accounting data are available at the web page
of two RIBs (http://consorzio.fg.it/; www.bonificaugento.it/) while the questionnaire is available
on request to the authors). The directors provided details regarding the way they carry out services,
how many divisions are involved and how many workers are employed, which job positions
(e.g., permanent and temporary personnel), how many resources are consumed (e.g., electronic
devices, cars, office furniture).
The most difficult item in assessing the M&C services was the joint cost allocation; for instance,
the cost related to the offices and technological devices, and above all, the personnel.
In order to allocate the joint costs, we focused on the share of items involved in the M&C
operations during a second interview with the director. The engineering method based on physical
quantities and measurements such as the duration of the service was used to evaluate the proportion
of each item (e.g., personnel, car fleet, devices). A recursive learning process was followed during the
interview. The director was first asked to estimate some proportions, then, after having completed the
cost estimates, he was asked to check the results against the accounting sheet (2014 and 2015 results).
Accordingly, a few adjustments were made.
2.3. The Capitanata (CBC) and Ugento Li Foggi (CBU) Case Studies
As reported in Table 3, the irrigable area of CBC is much greater than CBU. This has implications
for the size of the irrigation supply structures of CBC and CBU. On average, within the CBC,
each delivering point supplies 5 ha of irrigable area, while 1.6 ha within the CBU. Moreover,
the distribution of delivering points is not the same between the two systems, with CBU showing
a huge fragmentation of delivering systems and dispersion of delivering points. In both cases, one
delivery point can serve more than one user. At the same time, one user may use more than one
delivery point. In the case of CBC, the number of users is almost double the number of delivery points,
meaning that the same delivery point serves several users.













CBC 27,936 55,919 147,131 146,000 116,778,121
CBU 6554 1204 10,786 1000 1,289,084
Source: our analysis, considering ISTAT (Central Institute of Statistics) [6] data.
From 2011 to 2014, CBC delivered 2000 m3 per user, while CBU delivered almost 1000 m3 per
user. The difference in irrigation volume reflects the crop pattern of the respective provinces and its
irrigation requirements (Table 1).
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3. Results
3.1. The Organization of the M&C Service within the Two Consortia
The interview with the director of CBC revealed that M&C is concentrated during the irrigation
season, which starts in April and ends in November. M&C is simultaneously performed with other
operations (e.g., maintenance of water-delivery points), therefore the CBC does not rely on a division
devoted to M&C.
The CBC is divided into three hydraulic districts, and each one is under the responsibility of a
district manager. Every district includes about four operating centers (OCs), each of which is located
in a different office (the OC office), and relies on one technical manager, an office assistant and six
workers. The CBC has 13 OCs and 14 OC offices (one of the 13 OCs has two offices). The OC is
responsible for irrigation services (i.e., all of the operations including M&C), and each one covers an
area of about 12,500 hectares, with about 2500 delivery points.
Each CBC delivery point of is equipped with mechanical meters. Only a very small percentage
of CBC delivery points are equipped with electronic devices (AcquaCard) to meter the water
withdrawn [26]. However, the delivering points that have an AcquaCard system are also equipped
with mechanical meters.
There are four levels of tasks throughout the annual M&C process. At the beginning of the
irrigation season (in April) the on-site inspection starts within each OC. All the farms with CBC
delivering points sources are checked. The aim is to check how the delivery points and metering
devices are actually performing. During the irrigation season, the water volume is also recorded.
This is a comprehensive on-site inspection that takes place three times a year. The inspection is carried
out by a team of two people who use a car to move around. A report of each inspection is made,
and the office assistants fill in an electronic datasheet.
M&C is also carried out on-desk by the technical manager of each OC and his/her assistant,
assisted by three employees from the data-processing center. The records of each user are checked
against the theoretical irrigation requirement of each crop. However, the historical consumption is
used as the reference in order to check for any unusual observation. Only for the few delivering points
that have an AcquaCard system are the data obtained during the ordinary inspections also compared
with the AcquaCard data. If the comparison between the theoretical consumption (or AcquaCard data)
and the consumption detected during the ordinary inspections produces a deviation greater than 5%,
another inspection is carried out to discover the reason for the deviation.
This additional inspection is to verify the compliance with the CBC rules and, when necessary,
sanctioning is applied. Penalties depend on the specific rule violated, how long it has been going
on etc.
Overall, 90 employees are involved in the M&C operations (Table 4) using 65 cars and 14 offices.
Table 4. Allocation shares for the CBC joint costs.
Item Detail Number Share of ItemsInvolved in M&C
Personnel
District manager 3 30%
Personnel operating at operating centers (OCs) 28 50%
District manager 3 30%
Employees partially assigned to M&C 52 30%
Employees fully assigned to M&C 4 100%
Car fleet Depreciation, fuel, insurance, maintenance, tax 65 40%
OC offices and equipment Maintenance of consumable goods and furniture 14 20% 1
Note: 1 20% of the sum of the personnel and car fleet. Source: our analysis from direct surveys.
The most difficult item in assessing the M&C services of the CBC has been the joint cost allocation,
for instance the cost related to the car fleet which is jointly used for ordinary inspections as well as for
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any other activities where transport is needed. In fact, the car fleet is not fully at the expense of the
M&C operations. This also applies to the offices and technological devices, and above all, the personnel
assigned to each operational center. Table 4 reports the allocation share for joint costs.
Depending on their particular role regarding the M&C service, the percentage of work hours
dedicated to M&C varies from 30% to 50%, except for four employees assigned exclusively to M&C.
Regarding the cars used to carry out the M&C field operations, the percentage use of CBC vehicles is
about 40% for M&C operations in terms of depreciation, fuel, insurance, maintenance, tax. The CBC
offices are only partially utilized for M&C and the costs are related to consumable goods (i.e., electronic
devices) and furniture maintenance. On the basis of the RIB accounting sheets and the information
obtained from the interviews with the RIB directors, we obtained the percentage of OC office use
related to M&C by calculating 20% of the other M&C service costs related to the personnel and to the
car fleet. Considering Equation (1), the sum of the items personnel and car fleet relate to the items W, S,
Q, T and the part of M regarding the use of the car fleet.
The director of the CBU was also asked to complete the same email questionnaire as the CBC
Director in order to gather as much information as possible on the formal and informal routines
concerning the M&C services.
The CBU is divided into 32 hydraulic districts, with a single operating center (OC) for all the
32 districts. In the OC, the working unit consists of two technical managers, one technician and
18 workers. All of the 6554 delivering points are equipped with mechanical meters, while 80% points
also use the AcquaCard system.
The CBU irrigation season normally lasts from 15 April to 30 September. As a whole, M&C follows
the same procedures as the CBC. At the beginning of the irrigation season, the ordinary inspections
are performed. A total of 18 workers (working in groups of two) carry out the ordinary inspections.
Each delivery point is inspected once a month. A report is drafted at the office, an electronic datasheet
is filled in.
In the office, as with the CBC, the records of each user are checked against the theoretical irrigation
requirement of each crop. If the comparison between the theoretical and the actual consumption
detected during the ordinary inspections produces a deviation greater than 20%, then the CBU
organizes additional inspections. The tolerance limit is greater than the CBC, due to the lower
hydraulic efficiency.
The aim of this additional inspection is to verify compliance with CBU rules and, when necessary,
sanctioning is applied. The maximum penalty is EUR 4000, which equals the water cost for the
maximum possible consumption.
With regard to joint costs, unlike CBC, the yearly cost of the hired personnel and the car fleet are
reported in the CBU accounting sheet. On the other hand, the permanent staff, office services and
device costs are jointly shared with other services. Thus, Table 5 reports the allocation share for the
joint costs.
Table 5. CBU allocation shares for the joint costs.
Items Details Number Share of ItemsInvolved in M&C
Personnel
Technical manager 2 25%
Technician 1 5%
Workers 18 70%
Car fleet Depreciation, fuel, insurance, maintenance, tax 0 0
OC’s offices and equipment Maintenance of consumable goods and furniture 1 15% 2
Note: 2 15% of the sum of the items Personnel and Car fleet. Source: our analysis from direct surveys.
Unlike the CBC, for the CBU, the percentage of work hours dedicated to M&C varies a lot (from
5% to 70%). The workers are those most involved in the M&C operations. The CBU does not have a
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car fleet. In fact, CBU workers use their own vehicles during the on-field operations, and thus receive
a contribution for the expenses as reported in Table 6 (depreciation, fuel, insurance, maintenance, tax).
The costs connected to the use of the OC offices are related to consumable goods (i.e., electronic devices)
and maintenance of furniture. In the case of CBU, because there is only one OC office, the office use
accounts for 15% of the other M&C service costs, related to the personnel and car fleet. Also for CBU,
the sum of the items, personnel and car fleet consider the items W, S, Q, T and the part of M regarding
the car fleet use in the Equation (1). As a whole, the two RIBs exhibit a very similar operational routine
for the M&C operations, while the main differences relate to the categories of employees assigned to
each M&C operation and the car fleet.
3.2. The Cost of Monitoring and Control Services
On the basis of the data gathered and following the methodology framework proposed, the cost
of M&C was estimated. Table 6 shows the results of the M&C cost evaluation for CBC and CBU, taking
into account each single element of the Equation (1).
Table 6. M&C annual costs (in euros) for CBC and CBU.
RIBs Wages Salaries Quotas Taxes
Miscellaneous Expenses 1
Interest K (M&C Cost)
Mo Mcf
CBC (EUR) 511,546 573,650 92,481 4252 270,348 169,819 39,468 1,661,155
% of K 30.8 34.5 5.5 0.2 16.2 10.3 2.5 100
CBU (EUR) 15,004 200,698 0 0 32,335 0 4587 252,644
% of K 6 79.4 0 0 12.8 0 1.8 100
Note: 1 Mo is the part of Miscellaneous expenses related to the OC offices and equipment. Mcf is the part of the
miscellaneous expenses related to the car fleet. Source: our analysis on the basis of accounting data (2014 and
2015 results).
The results in Table 6 show that there are many differences between CBC and CBU. For example,
the cost of the employees is about 85% of the entire M&C service cost for CBU, while it is about 65% for
CBC. The reason for this difference is that CBU does not have a car fleet and the expenses related to
the car fleet use are included in the cost for the employees. For the same reason CBU has no expenses
for Quotas, Taxes, and Miscellaneous expenses related to the car fleet. In addition, considering the
costs related to the employees, the wages of CBU are much lower than CBC. This is because CBU
has only one office (as opposed to the 14 CBC offices). The fact that CBC has more offices than CBU
makes the miscellaneous expenses related to the OC’s office and equipment for the CBC higher than
for CBU. As Table 6 reports, it is worth mentioning that labour (i.e., wages and salaries) represents
the main cost for both RIBs. Certainly, new technologies based on remote sensing and data analyses
may be introduced to perform a similar task. However, this implies an increase in terms of cost for
the acquisition and continuous upgrading of the technology, and a higher cost for the analysis of data.
These infrastructural investments might be economically sustainable in case of large-scale application,
which is feasible in the case of homogenous areas.
The total annual cost of the M&C service of CBC is higher than CBU, because of their different
sizes in terms of the irrigation supply structure.
The M&C annual operational costs (K) of each RIB are reported per irrigable area, per delivered
cubic meter and per access point (Table 7).
The data regarding the percentage cost of the M&C service on the total amount of ordinary annual
balance sheet shows similar magnitude between the two RIBs, and are in line with the data of [27],
which found a figure of 8%. The CBU M&C service has a greater incidence on the total balance of the
RIB. Except for the delivery points, CBU’s items are consistently higher than those of CBC. Differences
are because of the fragmentation and size of the CBU’s irrigation infrastructure. While CBC has a high
number of delivery points, with five times the number of users, the ratio between delivery points and
users in the case of CBC is 0.5.
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Table 7. Results of the evaluation of the annual cost of the M&C service.
RIBs M&C AnnualCosts (EUR)
Cost Per Irrigable
Area (EUR/ha)
Cost Per Cubic Meter
Delivered (EUR/m3)




CBC 1,661,155 11.29 0.014 59 7%
CBU 252,644 23.42 0.19 38.5 10%
Source: our analysis on the basis of accounting data (2014 and 2015 results).
3.3. The Cost of Groundwater Metering and Control Service in Apulia
Taking the cost per delivery point as reported in Table 7 and the data in Table 2 regarding
the groundwater licenses issued in the two provinces, the cost of the groundwater metering and
control service is estimated: Foggia 2,117,392 euros, Lecce 1,328,301 euros. On the other hand, on
the basis of the groundwater withdrawals for the Province of Foggia, the cost is 1,199,929 EUR,
and 8,363,173 for Lecce.
We considered only the M&C service cost per access point because the M&C service for irrigation
groundwater is less influenced by the number of cubic meters delivered, and much more influenced by
the number of access points (the wells) that need to be ever inspected regardless the volume pumped.
As Table 8 shows, the weighted average cost of M&C for irrigation groundwater per access point
amounts to 49 euros.
Table 8. Total cost of M&C for the Provinces of Foggia and Lecce.
Irrigation Groundwater Access Points (Number) Cost Per Access Point(EUR/Access Point) Total Cost of M&C (EUR)
Foggia 35,888 59 2,117,392
Lecce 34,059 38.5 1,311,271.5
Weighted average - 49 -
Total 69,947 - 3,428,663.5
Source: our elaboration.
4. Concluding Remarks
The figures calculated in this research prove that the cost for M&C services incurred for the
implementation of the pricing scheme for groundwater are high. In fact, despite the best assumption of
operating in the most favourable conditions (i.e., the system and the organization are already running
at full regime; the personnel hold the experience and the skills; there is full collaboration between
farmers and institutions, the effect of information asymmetry is negligible), the cost ranges from
38.5 to 59 euros per delivery point. According to the findings of the two case studies, and considering
the composition of the cost structure, which is mainly affected by wages and salaries, it is worth
mentioning that some cost reduction may be pursued by introducing, for instance, remote sensing
tools for on-time real metering of irrigation water [28]. However, despite the fact that these technologies
may improve the quality of M&C operations (i.e., the accuracy and promptness of data recording)
they may not be effective in terms of cutting the actual operational cost. In fact, the role of human
control in rural areas, where the risk of robbery and tampering of high-tech devises may reduce their
effectiveness, should not be neglected.
It is very likely that the real cost for the full implementation of direct water pricing will be higher,
due to the initial investment needed to start the M&C services and the inefficiency that will arise
for the time needed between acquiring experience and optimizing all operations. In other words,
the overall transaction cost, of which metering and control is a sizable share, is very high. In this
regard, the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act [29] enacted by the California state government
has drawn attention to locally managed aquifers, also with the aim of reducing the transaction cost of
policy implementation.
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The implementation of the WFD to Mediterranean countries is particularly problematic due to
the fact that a large amount of the irrigation water is represented by groundwater. Thus, an effective
M&C service operated by the local authorities is a prerequisite for the adoption of a volumetric pricing
scheme, without which the beneficiary-pays principle will not be pursued while unlicensed users will
not be detected and stopped.
Despite the common acknowledgement that volumetric pricing should be applied to all water
sources, there is still a lack of awareness regarding the high cost for the M&C of private wells.
The magnitude of the full cost depends on the number of points to be controlled which, in the case
of groundwater refer to all existing wells, both those that are authorized and those that are not.
Today, in Apulia, it is estimated that there are many more wells in total than are effectively authorized,
of which there are about 120,000. The question here is whether the cost for M&C should be fully
recovered and paid for by farmers (at least those authorized), or should be considered as part of the
programme of measures to meet the WFD goals and, therefore, also shared by the whole of society.
Moreover, as the damage of groundwater over-exploitation is unevenly distributed across the irrigation
areas, namely coastal areas where farmers will take greater advantage from sustainable groundwater
use, the payment should also differentiate according to expected benefits.
While this research is the first attempt to account for the M&C cost of irrigation groundwater,
the main challenge for the future is how to reduce the cost of M&C in agriculture.
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